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Value-at-risk (VaR) has become a standard measure used in finan-
cial risk management due to its conceptual simplicity, computational
facility, and ready applicability. However, many authors claim that
VaR has several conceptual problems. Artzner et al. (1997, 1999),
for example, have cited the following shortcomings of VaR: (1) VaR
measures only percentiles of profit-loss distributions, and thus 
disregards any loss beyond the VaR level (“tail risk”), and (2) VaR is
not coherent since it is not sub-additive. To alleviate the problems
inherent in VaR, the use of expected shortfall is proposed. In this
paper, we provide an overview of studies comparing VaR and
expected shortfall to draw practical implications for financial risk
management. In particular, we illustrate how tail risk can bring
serious practical problems in some cases.
Key  words:  Value-at-risk; Expected shortfall; Tail risk; Sub-
additivity I. Introduction
Value-at-risk (VaR) has become a standard measure used in financial risk manage-
ment due to its conceptual simplicity, computational facility, and ready applicability.
However, many authors claim that VaR has several conceptual problems.
1 Artzner 
et al. (1997, 1999), for example, have cited the following shortcomings of VaR: 
(1) VaR measures only percentiles of profit-loss distributions, and thus disregards 
any loss beyond the VaR level (we call this problem “tail risk”
2), and (2) VaR is not
coherent since it is not sub-additive.
3
To alleviate the problems inherent in VaR, Artzner et al. (1997) have proposed the
use of expected shortfall.
4 Expected shortfall is defined as the conditional expectation
of loss given that the loss is beyond the VaR level. Thus, by its definition, expected
shortfall considers the loss beyond the VaR level. Also, expected shortfall is proved to
be sub-additive,
5 which assures its coherence as a risk measure. On these grounds,
some practitioners have been turning their attention toward expected shortfall and
away from VaR.
In this paper, we provide an overview of studies comparing VaR and expected
shortfall to draw practical implications for financial risk management. Focusing on
tail risk, we illustrate how it can bring serious practical problems in some cases.
Our main findings are summarized as follows:
(1) Information given by VaR may mislead rational investors who maximize their
expected utility. In particular, rational investors employing only VaR as a risk
measure are likely to construct a perverse position that would result in a larger
loss in the states beyond the VaR level.
(2) Investors can alleviate this problem by adopting expected shortfall as their
conceptual viewpoint, since, by definition, it also takes into account the loss
beyond the VaR level.
(3) The effectiveness of expected shortfall, however, depends on the stability of
estimation and the choice of efficient backtesting methods. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives our definitions 
and concepts of VaR and expected shortfall. Section III summarizes the criticisms 
of VaR made by Artzner et al. (1997). Section IV investigates the problem of tail 
risk in three cases: a portfolio with put options, a credit portfolio, and a portfolio
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1. For other criticisms of VaR, see Artzner et al. (1999), Basak and Shapiro (2001), Danielsson (2001), and Rootzén
and Klüppelberg (1999). 
2. We have followed the terminology of the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (2000).
3. A risk measure ρ is sub-additive when the risk of the total position is less than or equal to the sum of the risk of
individual portfolios. Intuitively, sub-additivity requires that “risk measures should consider risk reduction by
portfolio diversification effects.”
Sub-additivity can be defined as follows. Let X andY be random variables denoting the losses of two individual
positions. A risk measure ρ is sub-additive if the following equation is satisfied.
ρ (X +Y ) ≤ ρ (X) + ρ (Y ).
4. The concept of expected shortfall is also mentioned in Artzner et al. (1999), Kim and Mina (2000), and Ulmer
(2000).
5. For the proof of sub-additivity of expected shortfall, see the appendix of Acerbi, Nordio, and Sirtori (2001). dynamically traded in continuous time. Section V examines the applicability of
expected shortfall to the practice of financial risk management. Section VI lists some
cautions when using VaR for risk management. Section VII concludes the paper. 
II. Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall
This section provides our definitions and concepts of VaR and expected shortfall. 
A. Definition of Value-at-Risk
VaR is generally defined as “possible maximum loss over a given holding period
within a fixed confidence level.” That is, mathematically, VaR at the 100(1 – α ) 
percent confidence level is defined as the lower 100α percentile
6 of the profit-loss 
distribution (Figure 1).
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6. Artzner et al. (1999) define VaR at the 100(1 – α ) percent confidence level (VaR α (X )) as follows.
VaRα (X ) = –inf{x| P[X ≤ x] > α },
whereX is the profit-loss of a given portfolio. inf{x| A} is the lower limit of x given event A, and inf{x|P[X ≤ x] > α }
indicates the lower 100α percentile of profit-loss distribution. This definition can be applied to discrete profit-loss
distributions as well as to continuous ones. Since the loss is defined to be negative (profit positive), –1 is 
multiplied to obtain a positive VaR number when one incurs a loss within a given confidence interval. 
Using this definition, VaR can be negative when no loss is incurred within the confidence interval because the
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Figure 1  Profit-Loss Distribution and VaRB. Definition of Expected Shortfall
Artzner et al. (1997) have proposed the use of expected shortfall (also called “con-
ditional VaR,” “mean excess loss,” “beyond VaR,” or “tail VaR”) to alleviate the 
problems inherent in VaR.
7 Expected shortfall is the conditional expectation of loss
given that the loss is beyond the VaR level (Figure 2). The expected shortfall is
defined as follows.
The definition of expected shortfall
Suppose X is a random variable denoting the profit-loss of a given portfolio
and VaR α (X ) is the VaR at the 100(1 – α ) percent confidence level. ESα (X ) is
defined by the following equation.
8
ESα (X ) = E[–X | –X ≥ VaR α (X )]. (1)










Figure 2  Profit-Loss Distribution, VaR, and Expected Shortfall
7. Fishburn (1977), more than 20 years ago, proposed a risk measure similar to expected shortfall. The risk measure
proposed by Fishburn (1977) is defined as follows. 
Fγ (t) = ∫
t
–∞ (t – x)
γ dF(x)  γ > 0, 
where F(x) is the distribution function of a random variable denoting profit-loss, t is the target, and γ is the 
number of moments. 
Expected shortfall corresponds to this value if divided by (1 – confidence level) and added to VaR where γ = 1
and t = –VaR.
8. E[–X | B] is the conditional expectation of the random variable –X given event B. Since the profit-loss X is usually
negative given that the loss is beyond VaR, –X is used for the definition to make expected shortfall a positive number. C. Calculation of Economic Capital Using VaR and Expected Shortfall
VaR is the most popular measure used to calculate economic capital in financial risk
management. Furthermore, financial regulators adopt VaR partly to set regulatory
requirements for capital. The widespread use of VaR for economic capital calculation
may be due to its conceptual simplicity; the economic capital calculated by using
VaR at the 100(1 – α ) percent confidence level corresponds to the capital needed 
to keep the firm’s default probability below 100α percent. Thus, risk managers can
control the firm’s default probability through the use of VaR for risk management.
On the other hand, expected shortfall is defined as “the conditional expectation of
loss given that the loss is beyond the VaR level,” and measures how much one can
lose on average in the states beyond the VaR level. Since expected shortfall is by 
definition more than VaR, economic capital calculation using expected shortfall is
more conservative than that using VaR. However, the figure for economic capital 
calculated by using expected shortfall is hard to interpret with respect to the firm’s
default probability. Unlike VaR, expected shortfall does not necessarily correspond to
the capital needed to keep the firm’s default probability below some specified level.
III. Non-Normality and Problems of VaR
Artzner et al. (1997) have cited the following shortcomings of VaR: (1) VaR measures
only percentiles of profit-loss distributions, and thus it disregards any loss beyond the
VaR level, and (2) VaR is not coherent since it is not sub-additive. This section 
summarizes these criticisms by Artzner et al. (1997). We show that these problems
can be serious when the profit-loss does not obey normal distribution.
A. Risk Measurement with VaR When the Profit-Loss Distribution Is Normal
When the profit-loss distribution is normal, VaR does not have the problems pointed
out by Artzner et al. (1997). First, with the normality assumption, VaR does not have
the problem of tail risk. When the profit-loss distribution is normal, expected 
shortfall and VaR are scalar multiples of each other, because they are scalar multiples
of the standard deviation.
9 Therefore, VaR provides the same information about the
tail loss as does expected shortfall. For example, VaR at the 99 percent confidence
level is the standard deviation multiplied by 2.33, while expected shortfall at the
same confidence level is the standard deviation multiplied by 2.67. 
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9. When the profit-loss distribution is normal, expected shortfall is calculated as follows.
where I {A} is the indicator function whose value is 1 when A is true and 0 when A is false, and qα is the upper
100α percentile of standard normal distribution. 
For example, from this equation, expected shortfall at the 99 percent confidence level is the standard deviation
multiplied by 2.67, which is the same level as VaR at the 99.6 percent confidence level.
E[–X •I {X≤ –VaRα (X )}]             1                         t2
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2πSecond, sub-additivity of VaR can be shown as follows. Suppose that there 
are two portfolios whose profit-loss obeys multivariate normal distribution. With 
the normality assumption, as we mentioned earlier, VaR is a scalar multiple of 
the standard deviation, which satisfies sub-additivity.
10 Thus, VaR also satisfies 
sub-additivity.
11
Therefore, with the normality assumption, expected shortfall has no advantage
over VaR, since VaR satisfies sub-additivity and provides the same information about
the tail loss as does expected shortfall.
B. Risk Measurement with VaR When the Profit-Loss Distribution Is 
NOT Normal
If the profit-loss distribution is not normal, the problems inherent in VaR can be
serious. When we cannot assume normality, expected shortfall cannot be generally
represented by a function of the standard deviation. Thus, it is not certain whether
VaR provides the same information of the tail loss as does expected shortfall. We
should calculate expected shortfall as well as VaR to measure the loss beyond the VaR
level. Furthermore, VaR is not sub-additive in general without normality assumption.
Artzner et al. (1997, 1999) provide two simple cases where the problems inherent
in VaR are serious. The first is a short position on digital options, the second is a
concentrated credit portfolio.
Example 1: Short position on digital options
12
Consider the following two digital options on a stock, with the same exercise date
T. The first option denoted by A (initial premium u) pays 1,000 if the value of
the stock at time T is more than a given U, and nothing otherwise. The second
option denoted by B (initial premium l ) pays 1,000 if the value of the stock at
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10. If two random variables have finite standard deviations, the standard deviations are shown to be sub-additive as
follows. 
Let σ X and σ Y be standard deviations of random variables X and Y, and let σ XY be covariance of X and Y. Since
σ XY ≤ σ Xσ Y, the standard deviation σ X+Y of the random variable X +Y satisfies sub-additivity as follows. 
—————— – —————— —
σ X+Y ≡√ σ X
2 + σ Y
2 + 2σ XY ≤√ σ X
2 + σ Y
2 + 2σ Xσ Y = σ X + σ Y. 
σ XY ≤ σ Xσ Y can be proved as follows. Let Z be (Y – µ Y) – t(X – µ X) for a real value t, where µ X and µ Y are 
expectations of X and Y. 
E[Z
2]=   t
2E[(X – µ X)




2 – 2σ XYt + σ Y
2




2 – σ XY
2
E[Z




2] ≥ 0, σ XY ≤ σ Xσ Y follows.
11. To put it more precisely, when the profit-loss distribution is one of the elliptical distribution family and has finite
variance (see Ingersoll [1987] for the definition of the elliptical distribution family), VaR is sub-additive (see
Embrechts  et al. [1999]). The elliptical distribution family includes normal, t, and Pareto distributions.
However, for simplicity, we explain the problems of VaR according to whether the distribution is normal. 
12. The digital option (also called the binary option) is the right to earn a fixed amount of payment conditional on
whether the underlying asset price goes above (digital call option) or below (digital put option) the strike price.time T is less than L (with L < U ), and nothing otherwise. Since the payoffs of
those options are not linear, it is clear that the profit-loss distributions are not
normal even though the price of the underlying assets obeys normal distribution. 
Suppose L and U are chosen such that Pr(ST < L) = Pr(ST > U) = 0.008,
where ST is the stock price at time T. Consider two traders, trader A and trader B,
writing one unit of option A and option B, respectively. VaR at the 99 percent
confidence level of trader A is –u, because the probability that ST is more than U
is 0.8 percent, which is beyond the confidence level.
13 Similarly, VaR at the 
99 percent confidence level of trader B is –l. This is a clear example of the tail
risk. VaR disregards the loss of options A and B, because the probability of the
loss is less than one minus the confidence level.
Now consider the combined position on options A and B to show that VaR is
not sub-additive. VaR at the 99 percent confidence level of this combined 
position (option A plus option B) is 1,000 – u –l, because the probability that ST
is more than U or less than L is 0.016, which is more than one minus the con-
fidence level (0.01). Therefore, since the sum of VaR of individual positions
(option A and B) is –u –l, it is clear that VaR is not sub-additive (Table 1).
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Table 1  Payoff and VaR of Digital Options
Stock price Probability Option A Option B Option A + B (percent)
ST < L 00.8 u –1,000 + l –1,000 + u + l
L ≤ ST ≤ U 98.4 ul u + l
U < ST 00.8 –1,000 + ul –1,000 + u + l
VaR –u –l 1,000 – u – l
Example 2: Concentrated credit portfolio 
Suppose that there are 100 corporate bonds, all with the same maturity of 
one year. Also suppose that all bonds have a coupon rate of 2 percent, a yield-to-
maturity of 2 percent, a default probability of 1 percent, and a recovery rate of
zero.
14 Furthermore, it is assumed that the occurrences of defaults are mutually
independent.
First, we consider investing US$1 million into 100 corporate bonds, each 
with an equal amount of US$10,000. Since this portfolio results in a loss if 
more than one bond defaults in one year,
15 the probability of loss is approximately
26 percent (1 – the probability that all bonds do not default – the probability 
that only one bond defaults = 1 – 100 • 0.99
100 – 100 • 0.99
99• 0.01). Thus, for this
diversified investment, VaR at the 95 percent confidence level is positive since 
the probability of loss is more than 5 percent.
13. See Footnote 6. In this case, VaR is negative because the profit u is guaranteed at the 99 percent confidence level.
14. We assume that we incur loss only when the corporate bonds default within the holding period of one year.
15. When two corporate bonds default, we lose US$20,000 in principal payments from those two defaulted bonds.
However, we earn US$19,600 in coupon payments from the other 98 non-defaulted bonds. Therefore, the net
loss is US$400. If more than two bonds default, the loss is more than US$400.Second, we consider investing US$1 million into only one of those corporate
bonds. For this concentrated investment, we are 95 percent sure that this 
investment will earn US$20,000, because the default probability is 1 percent.
Therefore, VaR at the 95 percent confidence level is –US$20,000. This exemplifies
the tail risk of VaR, since VaR disregards the potential loss of default. Furthermore,
VaR is not sub-additive, because the VaR of the diversified portfolio is larger than
the VaR of the concentrated portfolio.
As we mentioned earlier, expected shortfall considers the loss beyond the VaR
level as a conditional expectation. Furthermore, expected shortfall is coherent since it
is proved to be sub-additive (Artzner et al. [1997, 1999], Acerbi and Tasche [2001],
and Acerbi, Nordio, and Sirtori [2001]). Artzner et al. (1997) have proposed the use
of expected shortfall on these grounds.
C. Relevance of the Problems of VaR
In this subsection, we consider whether the problems inherent in VaR are relevant 
to the practice of risk management. Our main idea is that, while the relevance of 
sub-additivity may depend on the preferences of risk managers, the tail risk is 
relevant because it is related to the insolvency of financial institutions, which is
among the central issues of financial risk management.
1. Sub-additivity
Whether VaR is valid as a risk measure depends on which aspects of risk are 
relevant to risk managers. A risk measure that considers all relevant aspects of risk
while ignoring irrelevant ones should be considered appropriate from a practical
standpoint, because a single risk measure cannot consider all aspects of the profit-
loss distribution. Therefore, one should not conclude that VaR is inappropriate
only because it is not sub-additive,
16 since sub-additivity itself may be irrelevant 
for risk managers.
For example, suppose that a firm with total assets of ¥100 million invests all of 
its assets in two catastrophe bonds:
17 bond A, linked to earthquakes in Tokyo, and
bond B, linked to earthquakes in Los Angeles. We also assume that all principal 
and coupon payments of bond A and bond B will be lost in the event of those 
catastrophes. The question is whether the firm should invest all of its assets in 
bond A or invest ¥50 million each in bonds A and B. If sub-additivity, or risk 
reduction by portfolio diversification effect, is considered important, investing 
¥50 million each in bond A and bond B is preferred. On the other hand, suppose 
the firm’s equity capital is less than ¥50 million and the risk manager regards the
probability of default as the most relevant aspect of risk. In this case, investing all of
its assets in bond A is preferred, because the probability that an earthquake will occur
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16. Rootzén and Klüppelberg (1999) provide a similar view on sub-additivity.
17. Catastrophe bonds are bonds whose coupon and/or principal payments depend on the loss of, or the occurrence
of, a natural catastrophe. Holders of catastrophe bonds can earn a higher coupon because of the inherent 
reinsurance fee. However, if a predefined catastrophe occurs, all or a part of coupon and principal payments are
lost to the bondholders.either in Tokyo or in Los Angeles is higher than the probability that an earthquake
will occur only in Tokyo.
18 For this risk manager, sub-additivity is irrelevant.
However, sub-additivity may be relevant in some cases. For example, Artzner et al.
(1997) have cited that, if sub-additivity is not satisfied, a financial institution will
only be able to reduce its required capital by dividing itself into separate institutions.
Furthermore, if an initial margin requirement by a futures exchange fails to satisfy
sub-additivity, futures traders can reduce their initial margin only by dividing their
accounts into separate accounts. This can be a problem for the futures exchange,
because it can be considered a loophole open to futures traders. Moreover, suppose
there exists a “conservative” way of aggregating risk simply by summing the VaR of
individual positions. If VaR is not sub-additive, this “conservative” way is no longer
conservative, because the VaR of the total position can be more than the sum of the
VaR of individual positions. 
2. The problem of tail risk 
On the other hand, the problem of tail risk is relevant to the practice of risk man-
agement, because the loss beyond the VaR level corresponds to the institutional 
insolvency caused by adverse market conditions. Since the institutional insolvency 
is the central concern for risk managers and financial regulators, disregarding the 
loss beyond the VaR level is disregarding the central concern of risk managers and
financial regulators.
19
This leads us to focus on the problem of tail risk in the next section. We 
emphasize that the problem of tail risk can bring serious practical problems.
IV. Tail Risk of VaR
Basak and Shapiro (2001)
20 show that the problem of tail risk can bring the following
practical problems:
(1) Information given by VaR may mislead investors, because it disregards the loss
beyond the VaR level.
(2) Rational investors employing only VaR as a risk measure are likely to con-
struct a perverse position that would result in a larger loss in the states beyond
the VaR level.
They also show that these problems can be especially serious for option portfolios
and credit portfolios. This section illustrates how the tail risk of VaR brings 
serious practical problems in three cases: an option portfolio, a credit portfolio, and 
a portfolio dynamically traded in continuous time.
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18. For example, if the probability that an earthquake occurs in Tokyo and the probability that an earthquake occurs
in Los Angeles are 1 percent, respectively, and the occurrences are mutually independent, the probability that an
earthquake occurs in at least one city, i.e., either Tokyo or Los Angeles, is about 2 percent. Since the firm’s equity
capital is less than ¥50 million, the default probability of the firm when it invests its assets in bonds A and B is 
2 percent, while the default probability when it invests all its assets in bond A is 1 percent.
19. See the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (2000). Furthermore, Federal Reserve Chairman
Greenspan (2000) noted, “In estimating necessary levels of risk capital, the primary concern should be to address
those disturbances that occasionally do stress institutional solvency—the negative tail of the loss distribution that
is so central to modern risk management.” 
20. For the details of Basak and Shapiro (2001), see Subsection IV.C.A. Option Portfolio
This subsection illustrates the tail risk of VaR with a simple position on a European
option. Suppose that an investor constructs a short position on a European option
whose maturity is one year. The underlying asset of the option is a stock whose 
current price and volatility are 100 and 30 percent, respectively. The price of 
the stock follows a binomial tree process with individual steps of 1/30 year and a
probability of upward movement of 0.6. The premium on the European option is the
expected payoff at maturity with respect to the risk-neutral probability discounted by
the risk-free interest rate.
For simplicity, the investor does not have any financial position other than this
short position on the one option. The initial premium received from the short posi-
tion is invested in a risk-free bond that earns an annual risk-free rate of 5.0 percent.
The investor can control only two variables: the strike price of the option and the
amount of the option position.
The final profit of this position is the sum of the payoff at maturity of this option
and the future value of the initial premium. Let p(K ) be the put option premium
with strike price K, Si the stock price at state i, and Pi the subjective probability of
state i. Furthermore, assume that the utility u(W ) of the investor is represented by
u(W ) = lnW, where W is the final wealth, which is the sum of the final profit and
the initial wealth (we assume here that the investor’s initial wealth W0 is 3,000).
Then, the expected utility E[u(W )] of the investor is as follows.
21
E[u(W )] = ∑ Pi
• ln{W0 + x • e
r • p(K ) – x • max[K – Si, 0]}. (2)
W : Final wealth
W0: Initial wealth
VaR is the lower α percentile of the profit-loss distribution of this position,
22 and
expected shortfall is the conditional expectation of loss given that the loss is beyond
the VaR level.
We analyze the effect of risk management with VaR and expected shortfall on 
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21. E[• ] is the expectation operator with respect to the subjective probability. 
22. Since the profit-loss distribution in this model is discrete, there may not be any event whose cumulative proba-
bility is equal to 5 percent. Therefore, from the definition in Footnote 6, VaR is calculated as the maximum loss
of the states whose cumulative probability is over 5 percent.
23. The minimum and maximum of the strike price are set at 35 and 288, respectively. Those values correspond to the
minimum and maximum of the final stock price in our binomial tree model. Furthermore, we constrained the
amount of the short position to be less than 60 units so that the final wealth would not be negative in any state.(2) Constraint with VaR at the 95 percent confidence level
maxE[u(W )], 
{x,K }
subject to VaR(95 percent confidence level) ≤ 5.
(3) Constraint with expected shortfall at the 95 percent confidence level
maxE[u(W )], 
{x,K }
subject to expected shortfall(95 percent confidence level) ≤ 7.
(4) Constraint with VaR at the 99 percent confidence level
maxE[u(W )], 
{x,K }
subject to VaR(99 percent confidence level) ≤ 5.
(5) Constraint with expected shortfall at the 99 percent confidence level 
maxE[u(W )], 
{x,K }
subject to expected shortfall(99 percent confidence level) ≤ 7.
Table 2 shows the results of the optimization problems (1), (2), and (3). The 
solution with no constraint ([1] in Table 2) consists of selling 21 units of a deep-
in-the-money option, while the solution with a 95 percent VaR constraint ([2] 
in Table 2) consists of selling 60 units of a far-out-of-the-money option. When 
constrained by VaR, the strike price is set just outside the 95 percent confidence
interval so that the investor does not incur a large loss within the 95 percent con-
fidence interval. However, the loss beyond the VaR level increases due to the increase
in the amount of the short position (Figure 3). This implies that, when constrained
by VaR, rational investors optimally construct a perverse position that would result in
a larger loss in the states beyond the VaR level.
24 On the other hand, the solution
with a 95 percent expected shortfall constraint ([3] in Table 2) involves little risk,
since it consists of selling an insignificant amount of the deep-in-the-money option. 
Figures 4 and 5, which show the cumulative profit-loss distribution of solutions
(1), (2), and (3), provide further illustrations. With the VaR constraint, the side of
the distributions (the area between the center and the tail of the distribution)
becomes thin to limit VaR by insuring the loss in the normal states. However, the tail
of the distributions becomes fat because the investor increases the amount of the
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24. Ahn, Boudoukh, and Richardson (1999) show that, to minimize the VaR of an option portfolio, it is optimal to
write an out-of-the-money option.
Table 2  Portfolio Profiles (95 Percent Confidence Level)
No constraint (1)
Constraint by Constraint by expected
VaR* (2) shortfall** (3)
Position Selling volume 021 060 000.23
Strike price 288 072 288.00
Risk measure VaR 570 005 006.00
Expected shortfall 643 213 007.00
** Optimize with the constraint that VaR at the 95 percent confidence level is less than or equal to 5. 
** Optimize with the constraint that expected shortfall at the 95 percent confidence level is less than or equal
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Figure 5  Cumulative Distribution of Profit-Loss: The Left Tail (95 Percent
Confidence Level)short position. On the other hand, with the constraint with expected shortfall, the
tail of the distributions becomes thin because the investor decreases the amount of
the short position to limit the loss beyond the VaR level.
Let us consider whether raising the confidence level of VaR to 99 percent can 
alleviate this problem. Table 3 shows the results of the optimization problems when
the confidence levels are raised to 99 percent. The solution with a 99 percent VaR
constraint ([4] in Table 3) consists of selling 60 units of the far-out-of-the-money
option, whose strike price is set just outside the 99 percent confidence interval.
Again, the loss beyond the VaR level is increased due to the increase in the amount 
of the short position. Therefore, we cannot mitigate the problem of VaR merely by
raising VaR’s confidence level (Figures 3 and 6).
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Figure 6  Payoff of Optimized Portfolios (99 Percent Confidence Level)
Table 3 Portfolio Profiles (99 Percent Confidence Level)
No constraint (1)
Constraint by Constraint by expected
VaR* (4) shortfall** (5)
Position Selling volume 021 060 000.18
Strike price 288 062 288.00
Risk measure VaR 774 005 007.00
Expected shortfall 816 123 007.00
** Optimize with the constraint that VaR at the 99 percent confidence level is less than or equal to 5. 
** Optimize with the constraint that expected shortfall at the 99 percent confidence level is less than or equal
to 7.
This subsection shows how the problem of tail risk brings serious practical 
problems in a simple option position. Investors can evade risk management with VaR
by manipulating the strike price and the amount of the option position. We cannot 
alleviate this problem merely by raising VaR’s confidence level.
B. Credit Portfolio
This subsection provides a simple illustration of how the tail risk of VaR can bring 
serious practical problems in credit portfolios. Risk management with VaR mayenhance credit concentration, because VaR disregards the increase of the tail loss due
to credit concentration.
Suppose that an investor invests ¥100 million in the following four mutual funds:
(1) concentrated portfolio A, consisting of only one defaultable bond with a 4 percent
default rate, (2) concentrated portfolio B, consisting of only one defaultable bond with
a 0.5 percent default rate, (3) a diversified portfolio that consists of 100 defaultable
bonds with a 5 percent default rate, and (4) a risk-free asset. For simplicity, we assume
that the profiles of all bonds in those funds are specified as follows: the maturity is one
year, the occurrences of default events are mutually independent, the recovery rate is 
10 percent, and the yield to maturity is equal to the coupon rate. We further assume
that the yield to maturity, the default rate, and the recovery rate are fixed until 
maturity. Table 4 shows the specific profiles of bonds included in these mutual funds.
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25. The probability that concentrated portfolio A does not default is 0.96 (1 – 0.04), and the probability that 
concentrated portfolio B does not default is 0.995. Furthermore, the probability that n bonds of the diversified




• 100Cn, where mCn is the number of combinations choosing n out of m. The
probability that both of the concentrated portfolios A and B do not default and n bonds of the diversified 
portfolio default is the product of those probabilities.
Table 4  Profiles of Bonds Included in the Mutual Funds
Number of Coupon Default rate* Recovery rate
bonds included (percent)  (percent) (percent)
Concentrated portfolio A 001 4.75 4.00 10
Concentrated portfolio B 001 0.75 0.50 10
Diversified portfolio 100 5.50 5.00 10
Risk-free asset 001 0.25 0.00 —
*The occurrences of defaults are mutually independent.
The probability that both of the concentrated portfolios A and B do not default






25 The probability that both of the concentrated portfolios A and 





• 100Cn. Therefore, assuming log utility, the expected utility of the investor is
as follows.
100




 1.0475 • X 1 + 1.0075 • X 2 
• ln 100 – 0.9n 
 + 1.055 • X 3
• ———— — + 1.0025 • (W0 – X1 – X2 – X3) 100
100




 1.0475 • 0.1X 1 + 1.0075 • X 2 
• ln 100 – 0.9n 
 + 1.055 • X 3
• ———— — + 1.0025 • (W0 – X1 – X2 – X3) 100100




 1.0475 • X 1 + 1.0075 • 0.1X2 
• ln 100 – 0.9n 
 + 1.055 • X 3
• ———— — + 1.0025 • (W0 – X1 – X2 – X3) 100
100




 1.0475 • 0.1X 1 + 1.0075 • 0.1X2 
• ln 100 – 0.9n  ,
 + 1.055 • X 3
• ———— — + 1.0025 • (W0 – X1 – X2 – X3) 100
(3)
W : Final wealth
W0: Initial wealth
X1 : Amount invested in concentrated portfolio A
X2 : Amount invested in concentrated portfolio B
X3 : Amount invested in the diversified portfolio
VaR and expected shortfall are calculated according to the definitions in Footnote 6
and Subsection II.B, respectively.
We analyze the impact of risk management with VaR and expected shortfall on the




(2) Constraint with VaR at the 95 percent confidence level
maxE[u(W )], 
{X1, X2, X3}
subject to VaR (95 percent confidence level) ≤ 3.
(3) Constraint with expected shortfall at the 95 percent confidence level 
maxE[u(W )], 
{X1, X2, X3}
subject to expected shortfall (95 percent confidence level) ≤ 3.5. 
(4) Constraint with VaR at the 99 percent confidence level 
maxE[u(W )], 
{X1, X2, X3}
subject to VaR (99 percent confidence level) ≤ 3.
(5) Constraint with expected shortfall at the 99 percent confidence level 
maxE[u(W )], 
{X1, X2, X3}
subject to expected shortfall (99 percent confidence level) ≤ 3.5.
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analyze the effect of risk management with VaR and expected shortfall by comparing
solutions (2)–(5) with solution (1).
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Figure 7  Cumulative Distribution of Profit-Loss (95 Percent Confidence Level)
Table 5  Optimal Portfolios by Each Type of Risk Management 
(95 Percent Confidence Level)
Risk management Risk management 
No constraint (1) with VaR* (2) with expected
shortfall** (3)
Portfolio Concentrated portfolio A 07.40 20.100 2.90
(percent) (default rate: 4 percent) 
Concentrated portfolio B 00.000 0.000 2.00
(default rate: 0.5 percent) 
Diversified portfolio 92.60 79.90 95.10
Risk-free asset 00.000 0.000 0.00
Risk measure VaR 03.35 03.00 02.75
(¥ millions) Expected shortfall 05.26 14.35 03.50
** Optimize with the constraint that VaR at the 95 percent confidence level is less than or equal to 3.
** Optimize with the constraint that expected shortfall at the 95 percent confidence level is less than or equal to 3.5.
Table 6  Optimal Portfolios by Each Type of Risk Management 
(99 Percent Confidence Level)
Risk management Risk management 
No constraint (1) with VaR* (4) with expected
shortfall** (5)
Portfolio Concentrated portfolio A 07.40 00.700 0.70
(percent) (default rate: 4 percent) 
Concentrated portfolio B 00.00 18.800 0.50
(default rate: 0.5 percent) 
Diversified portfolio 92.60 64.90 65.60
Risk-free asset 00.00 15.60 33.20
Risk measure VaR 06.77 03.00 03.13
(¥ millions) Expected shortfall 07.83 07.33 03.50
** Optimize with the constraint that VaR at the 99 percent confidence level is less than or equal to 3.
** Optimize with the constraint that expected shortfall at the 99 percent confidence level is less than or equal to 3.5.73
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Figure 10  Cumulative Distribution of Profit-Loss: The Left Tail (99 Percent
Confidence Level)First, we examine the solution of the optimization problem with a 95 percent VaR
constraint ([2] in Table 5). The amount invested in concentrated portfolio A is
greater than that of solution (1), that is, the portfolio concentration is enhanced as a
result of risk management with VaR. The cumulative probability distributions of the
profit-loss of the portfolios in Figures 7 and 8 show how risk management with VaR
brings about this perverse result. When constrained by VaR, the investor has to
decrease his investment in the diversified portfolio to reduce the maximum loss with
a 95 percent confidence level. The proceeds of the sales of the diversified portfolio
should be invested either in concentrated portfolios or in a risk-free asset.
Concentrated portfolio A has little effect on VaR since the probability of default is
outside the 95 percent confidence interval. Thus, the investor optimally chooses to
invest the proceeds in concentrated portfolio A, because this investment ensures a
higher return
26 and has little effect on VaR. Although VaR is reduced, this result
would be considered perverse because of its enhanced concentration and a larger loss
in the states beyond the VaR level. 
Second, we examine the solution with a 95 percent expected shortfall constraint
([3] in Table 5). When constrained by expected shortfall, the investor optimally 
reallocates his investment to a risk-free asset, substantially reducing the risk of the
portfolio. The investor cannot increase his investment in the concentrated portfolio
without affecting expected shortfall, which considers the loss beyond the VaR level 
as a conditional expectation. Therefore, unlike risk management with VaR, risk 
management with expected shortfall does not enhance credit concentration.
The next question we consider is whether raising the confidence level of VaR can
be a solution to the problem. Table 6 shows that, when constrained by VaR at the 
99 percent confidence level, the investor optimally chooses to increase his investment
in concentrated portfolio B because the default rate of concentrated portfolio B is 
0.5 percent, which is outside the confidence level of VaR. Furthermore, the cumula-
tive probability distributions of profit-loss of optimized portfolios (Figures 9 and 10)
show that risk management with VaR increases the loss beyond the VaR level. On the
other hand, risk management with expected shortfall reduces the potential loss
beyond the VaR level by reducing credit concentration.
This subsection showed that the tail risk of VaR causes failure of credit risk man-
agement. VaR can enhance credit concentration, because it disregards the loss beyond
the VaR level. On the other hand, expected shortfall reduces credit concentration,
because it considers the loss beyond the VaR level as a conditional expectation.
C. Dynamically Traded Portfolio
This subsection provides the third example, where investors trade two securities (a stock
and a bond) dynamically in continuous time. The results and the illustrations in this
subsection are completely dependent on Basak and Shapiro (2001).
27
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26. The result depends on the return of the concentrated portfolio. If the return of the concentrated portfolio is low,
the proceeds are invested in a risk-free asset. That is, whether the risk management with VaR enhances credit
concentration depends on the return of concentrated credits. 
27. For the purpose of simple illustration, we have substantially simplified the setting of Basak and Shapiro (2001)
and do not provide the detailed derivations of the solutions. See Basak and Shapiro (2001) for further details.In a general setting where investors trade assets dynamically in continuous time,
Basak and Shapiro (2001) show that, if investors are constrained to limit VaR to a
specified level, they optimally choose to construct a position that would result in a
larger loss in the states beyond the VaR level. Even though the prices of stocks in this
model are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion (or obey a log-normal
distribution), the profit-loss of the portfolio does not obey a log-normal distribution,
because dynamic adjustment of the portfolio creates non-linearity of the final payoff.
Suppose that an investor has initial wealth W (0) at t = 0, and maximizes his
expected utility. The utility function is the logarithm of the final wealth W (T) at 
t = T, or u(W(T )) = lnW(T). Because the utility is solely determined by the final
wealth, the investor has no incentive to consume his wealth until time t = T. 
The investor trades two assets, a risk-free bond B and a stock S, dynamically in 
continuous time. We further assume that the investor’s trading strategy is self-
financing; no money is added to or withdrawn from the portfolio between times 
0 and T. Therefore, as there is no consumption, the final value of the portfolio
results entirely from net gains or losses realized on the investment. The dynamics of
the prices of those assets are given by the following stochastic differential equations.
dB(t) = B(t)rdt,( 4 )
dS(t) = S(t)[µ dt + σ dw(t)], (5)
where w(t) is a standard Brownian motion and r, µ , and σ are constants. 
We consider the following state-price density ξ (t).
 1 µ – r  µ – r ξ (t) ≡ exp(–  r + — (—— –)
2
 t – ——–w(t)). (6)
 2      σ  σ
Since the trading strategy is self-financing and there is no consumption, the budget
constraint for the investor can be represented by the following equation. 
E[ξ (T)W(T )] ≤ W(0). (7)
Therefore, the optimization problem for the investor is formulated as follows.
maxE[lnW(T)], 
W(T )
subject to E[ξ (T) W(T)] ≤ W(0).
(8)
The solution for this problem is
W(0)  W(T) = —— –.  (9)
ξ (T) 
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W(T) = —— – = ———— = A
–1• W(0) • S(T ) , (10)




A • S(T)    
where A > 0 is constant.
Equation (10) shows that the optimal final wealth is a function of the stock price
at maturity. Figure 11 shows the relationship between the optimal final wealth and
the stock price at maturity.








Stock price at maturity
Figure 11  Optimal Final Wealth
Let us consider the effect of risk management with VaR on this optimization
problem. Since VaR is defined as “possible maximum loss over a given holding period
within a fixed confidence level,” VaR(α ) with a holding period of T at the 100(1 – α )
percent confidence level is defined as follows.
P(W(0) – W(T) ≤ VaR(α )) ≡ 1 – α . (11)
Here, we formulate risk management with VaR as limiting VaR to being less than or
equal to the equity capital. 
VaR(α ) ≤ Capital. (12)Let W – – be the difference between the initial wealth and the equity capital. W – – denotes
the minimum level of final wealth given that the loss is less than the equity capital
and the investor remains solvent. Equation (12) can be reformulated as
VaR(α ) ≤ W(0) –W – –. (13)
From equations (11) and (13), we obtain
P(W(T) ≥ W – –) ≥ 1 – α . (14)
This condition shows that to manage risk with VaR is to constrain the probability of
solvency to be more than 100(1 – α ) percent. Therefore, the optimization problem
with VaR risk management is formulated as follows.
maxE[u(W(T))], 
W(T )
subject to E[ξ (T)W(T)] ≤ W(0), (15)
P(W(T) ≥ W – –) ≥ 1 – α .
Figure 12 illustrates the solution of this optimization problem. To satisfy the VaR
constraint, the final wealth should be more than W – – within a given confidence interval.
However, to satisfy the budget constraint, the improvement of final wealth in those
states must be compensated for by the reduction of final wealth in other states. This
would lead to a decrease in final wealth in the states outside the confidence interval
compared with the optimal solution without a VaR constraint.
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S(T)






Out of VaR confidence interval:
100    percent α
100(1 –    ) percentile of stock price α
Confidence interval of VaR:
 100(1 –    ) percent α
W(T) (VaR constraint)
W(T) (No constraint) Loss out of VaR confidence
interval increases
Wealth is kept at W in the 
confidence interval
Figure 12  Optimal Final Wealth with VaR Risk ManagementTherefore, rational investors employing VaR as their sole risk measure take a 
position that would result in a larger loss when the stock price falls below the 
confidence interval.
28
Let us consider the effect of risk management with expected shortfall on the
investor’s rational decision. For simplicity, we redefine expected shortfall as the 
conditional expectation of loss given that the loss is beyond some threshold W – –.
29
We define risk management with expected shortfall as limiting this conditional
expectation to being less than or equal to some specific constant η , which can be
interpreted as the level of the investor’s equity capital. The formulation is given by 
E[W(0) – W(T )| W(T) ≤ W – –] ≤ η . (16)
Let ε ≡ η –W(0) +W – –, then
E[W – – – W(T)| W(T) ≤ W – –] ≤ ε. (17)
For simplicity, Basak and Shapiro (2001) modify equation (17) as follows.
30
E[ξ (T)(W – – –W(T))1{W(T)≤ W – – }] ≤ ε. (18)
From the definition of the conditional expectation,
E[ξ (T)(W – – –W(T))1{W(T)≤ W – – }] 
=E[ξ (T)(W – – –W(T))|W(T ) ≤ W – –]P(W(T) ≤ W – –). (19)
This equation shows that the left-hand side of equation (18) is the conditional 
expectation (adjusted by the state price density) multiplied by the probability 
of loss beyond the threshold. Basak and Shapiro (2001) call the left-hand side of 
equation (18) “limited expected loss (LEL).” We consider this a variant of expected




subject to E[ξ (T) W(T)] ≤ W(0), (20)
E[ξ (T)(W – – –W(T))1{W(T)≤ W – – }] ≤ ε.
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28. Using the general equilibrium framework, Basak and Shapiro (2001) show that the introduction of risk 
management with VaR would increase stock price volatility in the worst states. 
29. If we let W – – = W(0) – VaR(α ), this value corresponds to expected shortfall. However, since VaR(α ) changes
according to the investor’s trading strategy, the optimization problem becomes intractable if we use original
expected shortfall as a side constraint. Thus, we set this threshold at a constant W – –. 
30. In Equation (18), 1A is the indicator function that takes value 1 if A is satisfied and takes value 0 otherwise.Figure 13 illustrates the solution of this optimization problem. The investor 
optimally chooses to decrease the loss beyond the threshold to limit the expected
shortfall. However, with the budget constraint, the final wealth in the better states
decreases to compensate for the decrease in the loss beyond the threshold. Therefore,
risk management with limited expected loss, a variant of expected shortfall, prevents
investors from taking perverse positions that would result in a larger loss beyond 
the VaR level.
The result of this subsection implies that the tail risk can bring serious problems
when investors trade assets dynamically, since they can manipulate the final payoffs
of their portfolios through dynamic trading. Furthermore, this shows that the result
in Subsection IV.A of a static option trading strategy generally applies to broad types
of European option instruments, because the payoff of any European-type option can
be replicated by dynamic trading strategies.
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Loss in adverse stock price movement
decreases to limit LEL
Upside in favorable stock price movement
decreases because of budget constraint
Threshold 
of wealth
Stock price at maturity
Figure 13  Optimal Final Wealth with a Constraint by LEL
D. Manipulation of the Tail of Distribution
The illustrations in the previous subsections imply that, if investors can invest in
assets whose loss is infrequent but large (such as far-out-of-the-money options or
concentrated credit), the problem of tail risk can be serious. Furthermore, investors 
can manipulate the profit-loss distribution using those assets, so that the side
becomes thin and the tail becomes fat (Figure 14). This manipulation of the 
profit-loss distributions enables investors to decrease VaR without decreasing their
investment in risky assets.Moreover, raising the confidence level of VaR does not solve the problem, because
investors can construct positions that would result in a large loss beyond the new
confidence level. On the other hand, expected shortfall is less likely to provide 
perverse incentives, since expected shortfall considers the loss beyond the VaR level.
V. Applicability of Expected Shortfall
As we mentioned earlier, at least conceptually, expected shortfall is superior to VaR
because expected shortfall is less likely to provide perverse incentives to investors.
Moreover, Rockafeller and Uryasev (2000) show that portfolio optimization is easier
with expected shortfall than with VaR, because expected shortfall is convex while 
VaR is not.
However, to apply expected shortfall to the practice of risk management, risk
managers should weigh the strength and weakness of expected shortfall compared
with those of VaR (Table 7). From the practical point of view, the effectiveness of
expected shortfall depends on the stability of estimation and the choice of efficient
backtesting methods.
First, the accurate estimation of the tail of the distribution is especially important
for the effectiveness of expected shortfall, because expected shortfall considers the loss
beyond the VaR level as a conditional expectation.
31 However, the accurate estimation
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Figure 14  Cumulative Distribution of Profit-Loss When the Tail Risk Occurs
31. Extreme value theory (EVT) can be applied to estimate the tail of distributions. For numerical calculations of
expected shortfall using EVT, see Neftci (2000) and Scaillet (2000).of the tail of the distribution is difficult with conventional estimation methods. 
For example, the correlation among asset prices observed in normal market condi-
tions may break down in extreme market conditions. This correlation breakdown
would make it impossible for risk managers to estimate the tail of the portfolio
profit-loss distribution with only conventional Monte Carlo simulations with 
constant correlation.
32
Second, the backtesting of expected shortfall is difficult. The backtesting using
VaR tests the validity of a given model by comparing the frequency of the loss
beyond estimated VaR with the confidence level of VaR. On the other hand, the
backtesting using expected shortfall must compare the average of realized losses
beyond the VaR level with the estimated expected shortfall. This requires more data
than the backtesting using VaR, since the loss beyond the VaR level is infrequent,
thus the average of them is hard to estimate accurately.
VI. Notes of Caution When Using VaR for Risk Management
Although expected shortfall is a conceptually superior risk measure to VaR, the 
stability of estimation and the choice of efficient backtesting methods are yet to be
established. Therefore, we presume that VaR will be used as the standard measure 
in the finance industry. If this is the case, users of VaR such as risk managers and
financial regulators should be well cautioned concerning the problems of tail risk.
This section lists some notes of caution when using VaR for risk management.
A. Relevance of Tail Risk Depends on the Property of the Portfolio
Generally, a single measure cannot represent all aspects of risk. Therefore, risk 
managers should watch whether the aspects of risk missed by risk measures are 
relevant to the practice of risk management. We emphasized the problem of tail risk
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32. Historical simulations may not be able to ensure stable estimation because of insufficient historical data for tail loss.
Table 7  Strength and Weakness of VaR and Expected Shortfall
VaR is:
Strength —Related to the firm’s own default 
probability
—Easily applied to backtesting
—Established as the standard risk 
measure and equipped with sufficient
infrastructure (including software and
system)
Weakness —Unable to consider loss beyond the
VaR level (tail risk)
—Likely to give perverse incentives 
to investors if manipulation of the 
profit-loss distribution is possible
—Not sub-additive
—Difficult to apply to portfolio 
optimizations
Expected shortfall is:
—Able to consider loss beyond the VaR
level
—Less likely to give perverse incentives
to investors
—Sub-additive
—Easily applied to portfolio optimizations
—Not related to the firm’s own default
probability
—Not easily applied to efficient backtest-
ing method 
—Not ensured with stable estimation
—Insufficient in infrastructure (including
software and system)because tail risk can bring serious practical problems both for risk managers and
financial regulators.
Section IV shows that the tail risk is serious when investors have an opportunity
to invest in assets whose loss is infrequent but large. Option and credit portfolios are
typical of such vulnerable portfolios. Risk managers and financial regulators should
be cautioned when dealing with those kinds of portfolios. 
B. Risk Management with VaR May Give a Perverse Incentive 
to Rational Investors
Section IV showed that, if investors have an opportunity to invest in assets whose loss
is infrequent but large, the investors can reduce VaR by manipulating the 
profit-loss distributions. Furthermore, rational investors employing only VaR as a 
risk measure are likely to construct a perverse position that would result in a larger
loss in the states beyond the VaR level. Raising the confidence level of VaR cannot
solve this problem.
Therefore, users of VaR, such as risk managers and financial regulators, should be
always reminded of the perverse incentives provided by VaR, and should implement
complementary measures if necessary.
C. Implications for Stress Tests
The BIS Committee on the Global Financial System (2000) summarizes how stress
tests are used in internationally active financial institutions as follows. 
(1) Comparative analyses between the firm’s risk-taking and risk appetite
“Stress tests produce information summarising the firm’s exposure to extreme,
but possible, circumstances. Risk managers at interviewed firms frequently
described their roles within firms as assembling and summarising information
to enable senior management to understand the strategic relationship between
the firm’s risk-taking (such as the extent and character of financial leverage
employed) and risk appetite.”
(2) Measurement of tail risk
“If large losses carry an especially heavy cost to the firm, senior management
may use stress tests to guide the firm away from risk profiles with excessive 
tail risk.”
Conventional practices of stress tests such as calculating VaR at a high confidence
level (for example, 99.99 percent) or calculating extreme loss with historical or 
hypothetical stress scenarios may be appropriate for the first purpose (i.e., analyses
comparing the firm’s risk-taking and risk appetite). However, those conventional
methods are not appropriate for the second purpose (measuring tail risk), because
they are based solely on the single point of profit-loss distributions. Traders can 
evade risk limits calculated by the conventional stress tests by taking an excessive 
risk beyond this point. To measure the portfolio’s vulnerability to tail risk, risk 
managers should adopt risk measurement methods that can incorporate information 
concerning the tail, typically risk measurement with expected shortfall.
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Some practitioners may counter the criticisms of VaR, saying, “At the trading desk
level, we do not rely solely on VaR. Risks are managed with numerous quantitative
and qualitative measures such as detailed monitoring of the profit-loss diagrams of
individual positions. Thus, the tail risk can be managed adequately with those 
conventional risk management practice at the desk level.”
The validity of this view depends on whether adequate tail risk management at
the desk level ensures adequate tail risk management at the companywide level. If this
does not hold, the validity of the practitioner’s view would be seriously questioned.
We can infer the validity of this view using sub-additivity of expected shortfall. Since
expected shortfall is sub-additive, expected shortfall of the total position is no more
than the sum of expected shortfall of the individual positions. If we can consider
expected shortfall to represent the tail risk, adequate risk management at the desk
level ensures appropriate risk management at the companywide level. This suggests
the necessity and the effectiveness of adequate risk management at the desk level.
E. Importance of Managing Credit Concentration
Subsection IV.B showed that credit concentration plays the main role in the tail risk 
of credit portfolios. Credit Suisse Financial Products (1997) notes that credit risk
management beyond the VaR level should be “quantified using scenario analysis and
controlled with concentration limits.” When we use VaR for the risk management 
of credit portfolios, we should ensure that credit concentration is limited by 
complementary measures, since VaR disregards the increase of the potential loss 
due to credit concentration.
VII. Concluding Remarks
We considered the validity of VaR as a risk measure by comparing it with expected
shortfall. We emphasized the problem of tail risk, or the problem that VaR disregards
the loss beyond the VaR level. This problem can bring serious practical problems,
because information provided by VaR may mislead investors. Investors can alleviate
this problem by adopting expected shortfall, since it also considers the loss beyond the
VaR level. However, the effectiveness of expected shortfall depends on the stability of
estimation and the choice of efficient backtesting methods. Risk managers should
weigh the strength and weakness of expected shortfall before adopting it as part of
the practice of risk management.
There are several outstanding issues for further research other than the problems
of the stable estimation and the efficient backtesting of expected shortfall. Among 
the most important issues is how to identify portfolios vulnerable to the tail risk 
efficiently. If we know how to identify vulnerable portfolios, we are able to manage
tail risk efficiently by implementing complementary measures such as calculation 
of expected shortfall only to those vulnerable portfolios. Section IV provides 
an intuitive answer to this question; a portfolio that includes assets whose loss is 
large but infrequent is vulnerable to tail risk because investors can manipulate the
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it does not answer how large is “large” enough or how infrequent is “infrequent”
enough for tail risk to bring serious practical problems. Therefore, we hope that
future research will provide us with more rigorous guidance on how to identify 
vulnerable portfolios.
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